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USING APPELLATE ADVOCACY TO EXPAND A CIVIL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES

Susan M. Finegan & Laura W. Gal*
INTRODUCTION
“You have the right to remain silent . . . . You have the right
to an attorney . . . . If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
provided for you.”1 Whether from television or from law school,
most Americans, even children, have heard or read some version of
a Miranda Warning. We are familiar with the idea that a person is
entitled to legal representation when charged with a criminal
offense punishable with jail time and that, if the accused cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed at the government’s
expense.2 What if a person’s physical liberty is not at stake, but the
loss of housing or custody of a child is at risk? Are there other
rights so fundamental to our society’s sense of liberty that a right to
counsel is, or should be, recognized?
This question has gained increasing attention in recent years,
as civil courts have grappled with an unprecedented increase in
unrepresented litigants.3
The American justice system is
predicated on having a judge preside over a lawsuit involving two
opposing parties—both represented by counsel. As a result, the
* Susan Finegan is a litigation partner at Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky
and Popeo, P.C., and is Co-Chair of the Massachusetts Access to Justice Commission.
Gal and Finegan were the lead counsel in L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Prob. & Family
Ct. Dep’t, 49 N.E.3d 230 (Mass. 2016) and Guardianship of J.T., 49 N.E.3d 242 (Mass.
2016), which was argued alongside L.B., respectively. Laura W. Gal is a Staff Attorney
in the Family Law Unit at Community Legal Aid. The authors would like to thank law
students Emma Nitzberg and Merry Sheehan for their extensive assistance with this
Article.
1. What Are Your Miranda Rights?, MIRANDAWARNING.ORG, http://
www.mirandawarning.org/whatareyourmirandarights.html
[https://perma.cc/5XGYQFJR].
2. Id.; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN & PATRICIA A. KINDREGAN,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. THE TRIAL COURT PROB. & FAMILY COURT DEP’T, PRO
SE LITIGANTS: THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE (1995), http://www.mass.gov/courts/
docs/courts-and-judges/courts/probate-and-family-court/prosefinalreport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3A6X-TGMR].
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system of rules that developed over time is often difficult to
understand by those who must represent themselves. A single
party unfamiliar with the rules of litigation can make the process
more difficult and more resource-consuming for all parties and for
the courts. In addition, lack of understanding can lead to lack of
faith in our system of laws. To address this phenomenon, court
systems throughout the country have implemented innovative
approaches to assist unrepresented litigants, including the
simplification of court forms, the development of online resources
in plain language, and the opening of court-service centers with
court staff available to provide information. While such efforts are
laudable, and indeed necessary, it is important that access to justice
advocates not lose sight of the important roles lawyers play, and
the impact on outcomes lawyers could have in the cases in which
litigants must forge ahead without such assistance. While perhaps
appointment of counsel for all low-income litigants, in all case
types, is not realistic from a fiscal standpoint, or necessary from a
due process perspective, providing lawyers for low-income litigants
in certain types of cases is not only helpful, it is constitutionally
required.
This Article explores an important avenue for the access to
justice movement: appellate lawyers using the due process clause of
both the state and federal constitutions to advocate for a
constitutionally based right to counsel. Through examination and
discussion of the Supreme Judicial Court’s (SJC) April 2016
decision in L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family Court
Department,4 this Article details this approach in the context of
private child custody actions.
L.B. is the most recent Massachusetts case to address the
question: when does a parent have a right to counsel in a custody
case concerning the parent’s child? The answer to this question has
been developing over the past several decades, and the SJC’s
decision in L.B. marked a significant expansion of this right in cases
involving a parent versus a non-parent. It also marked a new
approach to balancing the rights of parents with the fiscal
constraints of the state. In L.B., the court held that an indigent
parent whose child is under guardianship has a right to counsel if
the parent presents a “meritorious” claim for: (1) removal of the
guardianship; or (2) a substantial expansion of parental visitation

4.

L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 232.
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under the guardianship.5 The decision is interesting both for its
expansion of the class of proceedings in which a right to counsel
may exist and for the initial burden the court imposes on pro se
litigants as a prerequisite to triggering their right to counsel. The
creation of the “meritorious” threshold allowed the court to extend
a right to counsel into a new class of proceedings without
guaranteeing counsel in all proceedings of the given class. Future
appellate advocacy will likely be necessary to determine what
evidence or assertion is sufficient to trigger the right.
I.

CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL: AN OVERVIEW

A. National Movement
A right to counsel in criminal matters was first recognized
more than fifty years ago in the 1963 landmark Supreme Court
decision, Gideon v. Wainwright.6 In Gideon, the Court found a
criminal defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
could not be protected without access to counsel.7 Since that time,
courts and legislatures have wrestled with the question of when
indigent litigants have the right to counsel in civil proceedings. As
articulated in the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services of Durham County, the analysis for
determining due process rights is complicated, and the answer far
from straightforward: “[f]or all its consequence, ‘due process’ has
never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined . . . .
Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental
fairness,’ a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its
importance is lofty.”8
In Lassiter, the state terminated Abby Lassiter’s (petitioner)
parental rights to her infant son. She appealed the termination,
asserting her due process rights had been violated by the state’s
failure to provide her with a court-appointed lawyer.9 She could
not afford a lawyer to represent her at the trial court proceeding
5. See id. at 241–42.
6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7. See id. at 341–45.
8. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
9. It is noteworthy that Lassiter was decided on federal constitutional grounds.
The decisions in L.B., and cases leading up to that decision, suggest that state
constitutions may provide broader protections. Lassiter did not foreclose recognition
of a right to counsel in custody or other civil proceedings, but it indicated a restrictive
view that providing counsel is a necessity to preserving due process. See id. at 33–34.
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and argued she could not effectively defend her parental rights
without one.10 Applying the three-prong balancing test (“Mathews
Test”) articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge,11 the Court held that
protection of due process rights of the particular litigant at hand
did not require appointment of counsel, both because of alternative
measures taken to protect the litigant’s rights and the litigant’s
failure to avail herself of other opportunities to protect and
promote her relationship with her child.12 Nonetheless, the Court’s
focus on the facts of the individual case left room for future
litigation of the issue; a different set of circumstances might tip the
Mathews analysis in the parent’s favor. Moreover, the court made
a point of acknowledging that access to counsel may be
appropriate, even if not constitutionally required:
In its Fourteenth Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the
States the standards necessary to ensure that judicial
proceedings are fundamentally fair. A wise public policy,
however, may require that higher standards be adopted than
those minimally tolerable under the Constitution. Informed
opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is
entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in
parental termination proceedings, but also in dependency and
neglect proceedings as well . . . . Most significantly, 33 States
and the District of Columbia provide statutorily for the
appointment of counsel in termination cases. The Court’s
opinion today in no way implies that the standards increasingly
urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by
the States are other than enlightened and wise.13

In the decades since Lassiter, a national movement to
recognize a right to counsel in civil cases has gained significant
momentum. Proponents of a civil right to counsel advocate that
self-represented litigants should have counsel in any case affecting
“basic human needs” such as housing, health, safety, sustenance
and child custody matters.14
10. See id. at 24.
11. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The three-prong balancing test is:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest,
including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedures would entail.” Id. at 321.
12. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32–33.
13. Id. at 33–34 (citations omitted).
14. See Jillian Jorgenson, Civil Discourses: Lawmakers and Legal Experts Want
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State Initiatives

Advocates at both state and local levels have pursued a variety
of approaches to obtain a civil right to counsel.15 This year alone,
over two dozen bills in multiple state legislatures have been filed
that would establish or expand a civil right to counsel in varying
circumstances.16 One of the more promising recent bills hails from
New York City and guarantees low-income residents an attorney in
eviction proceedings.17 This bill has garnered substantial political
support and inspired similar efforts in other states.18 A similar bill
is now pending in the Massachusetts House of Representatives.19
In addition to legislative fixes, advocates have tried local pilot
projects to demonstrate that providing counsel in certain
circumstances could make a significant difference in case outcomes.
One such example was a two-court pilot program, which provided
an attorney in certain categories of eviction cases in Quincy,
Massachusetts District Court and the Northeast Housing Court.
These pilot programs were developed through the collaboration of
the Boston Bar Association, two legal-services organizations
(Greater Boston Legal Services and Northeast Legal Aid),
academics from Harvard University, and many others.20 The pilot

to Expand Your Right to a Lawyer, OBSERVER (Aug. 20, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://
observer.com/2015/08/civil-discourse-lawmakers-and-legal-experts-want-to-expandyour-right-to-a-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/XW8G-ML8Z].
15. See BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHTS TO
COUNSEL, GIDEON’S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
MASSACHUSETTS apps. 3 & 4 (Sept. 2008), https://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/
GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FK5M-VJV5]
(detailing
types
of
Massachusetts cases in which a right to counsel has been found through statute or case
law). The National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, a national advocacy
organization based in Maryland, has a comprehensive list of state-by-state approaches,
including litigation, legislation, and pilot projects. See NCCRC, http://www.civilright
tocounsel.org [https://perma.cc/96MF-VXMZ].
16. See 2016 Civil Right to Counsel Bills, NCCRC, http://civilrighttocounsel.org/
highlighted_work/legislative_developments/2016_civil_right_to_counsel_bills [https://
perma.cc/7W9C-YC9B].
17. See N.Y. State Assemb. S02061B, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015),
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=S02061&term=2015&Summary=Y&
Actions=Y&Text=Y&Votes=Y [https://perma.cc/9BV9-U7RV].
18. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, For Tenants Facing Eviction, New York May
Guarantee a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/
27/nyregion/legal-aid-tenants-in-new-york-housing-court.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5348-M5KH].
19. See H.B. 1560, 189th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2015).
20. See BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHTS TO
COUNSEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATION IN EVICTION CASES AND
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programs in both communities had a variety of favorable
outcomes—including preventing evictions and protecting tenants’
rights—confirming the essential role that attorneys play in such
cases.
In the Quincy pilot, “full representation [] allowed more than
two-thirds of the tenants in this pilot to avoid the destabilizing
consequences of eviction, including potential homelessness” and
these tenants, with the help of an attorney, “also received almost
five times the financial benefit (e.g., damages, cancellation of past
due rent) as those without full representation.”21 Last, courts in
Massachusetts and elsewhere have found a constitutionally based
civil right to counsel in a number of areas.22
II.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS

As illustrated by the long list of supporting studies referenced
in Lassiter, expansion of a civil right to counsel has been
particularly successful in child custody cases.23 The need for
counsel in custody proceedings is compelling because the cases are
complex and the stakes are high. Presentation of evidence often
involves expert testimony, decisions are based largely on casespecific facts, and trial court judges have tremendous discretion to
assess factors such as the credibility of witnesses.24 Failure to
effectively present one’s case could result in interference with a
fundamental right of (wo)man: the right to parent one’s child.25

HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION (Mar. 2012), http://www.bostonbar.org/docs/defaultdocument-library/bba-crtc-final-3-1-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8BV-GCDM].
21. See id. at 2. While the Northeast Housing Court pilot provided less dramatic
results for those obtaining full representation, that was likely due to the fact that
tenants there, whether in the control group or in the full representation group, could
get access to a lawyer in a lawyer for a day program sponsored by legal aid. See id. at
18–24.
22. See generally Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1979)
(recognizing parents’ right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases).
23. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durnham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 39 n.6, 46–
47 n.15–16 (1981).
24. See In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 111 (Mass. 2012) (noting
the complexity in J.K.B. is “no less present” in cases between private parties); Bezio v.
Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980); J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d at 408–09 (noting cases
“may well involve complex questions of fact and law, and require the marshalling and
rebutting of sophisticated expert testimony . . . [and] the balance [of rights] to be struck
is more complex”); Guardianship of Estelle, 875 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
25. Care and Protection of Jamison, 4 N.E.3d 889, 900–01 (Mass. 2014) (quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)) (noting parental rights “among the
‘essential’ and ‘basic civil rights of man’”).
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Parenthood and the autonomy and sanctity of the family unit are so
fundamental to our society, they are constitutionally protected.26
As a result, most states have adopted statutory schemes under
which indigent parents are entitled to legal counsel whenever the
state seeks to take or maintain custody of the parents’ child(ren).27
However, prior to enactment of statutory protection, case law first
established this right in Massachusetts, and litigation continues to
be an effective tool to ensure that parents’ constitutionallyprotected liberty interests in their relationships with their children
are protected.
A. Developing a Right to Counsel One Case at a Time
Child custody cases present in three categories: (1) those
pitting one or both parents against the state (e.g., care and
protection cases and petitions to terminate parental rights filed by
the Department of Children and Families), (2) those in which a
private third-party seeks to take custody away from a parent (e.g.,
private adoptions and guardianship of minor petitions), and
(3) those involving one parent against the other (e.g., divorce
actions, separate support actions, and paternity actions).
Recognition of a right to counsel was established earliest in the first
of these categories and more recently in the second. Although
statute provides discretionary access to counsel in the third
category, a right to counsel has yet to be identified.
In Massachusetts, statutory law now guarantees an indigent
parent court-appointed counsel in child custody cases in which the
Commonwealth is a party.28 Prior to statutory law, the right to
counsel in custody cases was first recognized through case law. In
1979, in J.K.B., the SJC was presented with the question of whether
an indigent parent is entitled to appointed counsel in a proceeding
to terminate the parent’s parental rights.29 The court held that
indigent parents do have a right to a court-appointed lawyer in such
circumstances because:
[a]n indigent parent facing the possible loss of a child cannot be

26. Courts accord “substantial respect” towards “family autonomy . . . a ‘private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’” Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1212 n.6
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
27. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34 (“Most significantly, 33 States and the District of
Columbia provide statutorily for the appointment of counsel in termination cases.”).
28. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (2016).
29. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406, 406 (Mass. 1979).
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said to have a meaningful right to be heard in a contested
proceeding without the assistance of counsel . . . . Provision of
appointed counsel not only safeguards the rights of the parents,
but it assists the court in reaching its decision with the ‘utmost
care’ and ‘an extra measure of evidentiary protection,’ required
by law.30

J.K.B. was among the cases the United States Supreme Court
cited in Lassiter.31
Shortly after the Lassiter decision, the
Massachusetts legislature created a statutory right to counsel for all
custody proceedings in which the Department of Children and
Families is a party.32 This law is still in effect today.
After the surge of right-to-counsel litigation and legislation in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, it took more than twenty-five years
to make the leap from parent versus state custody cases to parent
versus private third-party custody cases. In 2012, further litigation
led to recognition of a right to counsel in privately filed adoption
petitions.33 In J.K.B., the court highlighted the “vastly superior
resources for investigation” of the state in comparison to the
parent.34 In Meaghan, the court shifted focus from the power of the
state to the importance of the rights at stake, finding that “[w]here
the petitioner is a private party, the same fundamental,
constitutionally protected interests are at stake [for the defendant
parent], and the cost of erroneously terminating the parent’s rights
remains too high to require an indigent parent to risk it without
counsel.”35
The decision in Meaghan opened the door to the consideration
of other private-custody actions, and legal services agencies quickly
identified another area of need. Increasingly, parents were losing
custody of their children to guardianship of minor petitions filed by
private parties, often a grandparent or other relative. The
guardianship statute is an important means by which extended
family and friends can step in to help parents and children in
need—many guardianships are done by consent of all parties.
However, when parties do not agree, problems may arise. While a
decree of guardianship does not terminate parental rights, it is
“permanent” in the sense that the law presumes the child will
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 408.
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (2011).
See In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 111 (Mass. 2012).
See J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d at 408.
In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d at 113.

2017]

APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES

317

remain in the guardian’s care and custody until the child reaches
majority, and there is no statutory obligation for either the court or
guardian to work toward reunification of parent and child.36 In
contrast to care and protection law, the guardianship statute does
not require annual review hearings and does not require any show
of efforts toward reunification.37 Additionally problematic, it is
unclear what standard of proof should apply when a parent seeks to
regain custody.38 Despite these shortcomings in statutory guidance,
the guardianship statute—unlike the care and protection statute—
has no provision for the appointment of counsel for parents. This
disparity of available protections led advocates to question whether
a parent’s due process rights in a guardianship proceeding were
adequately protected without legal representation.
In 2015, lawyers from Northeast Justice Center filed an appeal
on behalf of a mother whose child was under guardianship, arguing
her lack of legal counsel at the initial guardianship proceeding had
left her without due process.39 The SJC took the case on its own
initiative and held that indigent parents have a right to counsel
when a third party seeks to take custody from a parent through a
private-guardianship proceeding.40 Using the same basis found in
both the J.K.B. and Meaghan decisions, the court reasoned:
[T]here is every reason, given the fundamental rights that are at
stake, why an indigent parent is entitled to the benefit of
counsel when someone other than the parent, whether it be the
State or a private entity or individual, seeks to displace the
parent and assume the primary rights and responsibilities for
the child, whether it be in a care and protection proceeding, a
termination proceeding, an adoption case, or a guardianship
proceeding.41

In contrast to the expansive language in the court’s reasoning,
the holding in V.V. specifically referenced only chapter 190B,
section 5-206 of the Massachusetts General Laws, which defines the
procedure by which a permanent guardian may be appointed for a

36. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-202 (2009).
37. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 §§ 29B(a), 29(C).
38. See generally Guardianship of Verity, No. 15-P-778, 2016 WL 2941076 (Mass.
App. Ct. May 19, 2016) (demonstrating the ongoing lack of clarity about standard and
burden of proof).
39. See Guardianship of V.V., 24 N.E.3d 1022, 1024 (Mass. 2015).
40. Id. at 1025.
41. Id.
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child.42 The holding contained no mention of section 5-212, which
defines the procedure by which a decree of guardianship can be
modified or terminated.43 Although the court made clear that
parents had the right to counsel at the initial-decree stage of a
guardianship proceeding, it left open the issue of whether the right
to counsel extended to post-decree actions to terminate or modify a
decree of guardianship.
B.

The Decision in L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family
Court Department: New Rights, New Limitations

Advocates for parents found language in the V.V. decision
suggestive of a broad right to counsel. In a footnote, the court
stated, “[O]ur concern regarding whether a parent is entitled to
counsel applies to all proceedings related to guardianship.”44 The
court also observed that a parent’s parental rights are “severely
circumscribed . . . for as long as the guardianship remains in
effect.”45 Last, the court also noted that because of the impact a
guardianship has on a parent-child relationship and
the particular nature of the fundamental rights at stake, an
indigent parent whose child is the subject of a guardianship
proceeding is entitled to, and must be furnished with, counsel in
the same manner as an indigent parent whose parental rights
are at stake in a termination proceeding or, similarly, in a care
and protection proceeding.46

Given that counsel is statutorily available in all phases in a
care and protection action, one could conclude from the court’s
language that the court meant for the right to be expansively
adopted in guardianship proceedings.
Advocates interpreted this language as clearly endorsing a
right to counsel throughout the life of a guardianship. However,
Chief Justice Ordoñez of the Massachusetts Probate and Family
Court, who was responsible for the implementation of the V.V.
decision, took a more measured approach. Relying on the specific
language of the holding in V.V., Chief Justice Ordoñez released a
guidance memorandum to the Probate and Family Court judges
defining the right to counsel as limited to the initial-petition, pre42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 1023–24 n.2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1024.
Id.
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decree, stage: “[T]he right to counsel for indigent parents only
applies in a Petition to Appoint a Guardian of a Minor.”47
The contrast between the court’s far-reaching discussion and
its restrictive holding confounded both lawyers and judges, leading
almost immediately to further litigation.
On May 6, 2015,
Community Legal Aid (CLA) utilized a statute that allows for
Direct Appellate Review by a single justice of the SJC to challenge
the policy Chief Justice Ordoñez set in her February 20, 2015
Memorandum.48 CLA filed suit on behalf of two mothers —L.B.
and C.L.—whose children were under guardianship, challenging
Chief Justice Ordoñez’s guidance memorandum. The single justice
reported the matter to the full SJC panel. Also on May 4, 2015, a
trial court judge from Hampden County Probate and Family Court
reported the same issue to the Appeals Court in Guardianship of
J.T., and the SJC transferred the case on its own motion.49 Oral
arguments for the two cases were scheduled together for a single
presentation of the issue of whether indigent parents of children
under decrees of guardianship have a right to counsel when seeking
to regain custody of, or expand visitation with, their children.50
Members of the private bar agreed to provide pro bono
representation to the mother of J.T. These advocates worked with
CLA to craft a coordinated argument in favor of further expanding
parents’ right to counsel. Amicus counsel from Massachusetts Law
Reform, the Boston Bar Association, Committee for Public
Counsel Services, and members of the private bar also collaborated
with lead counsel in developing these arguments.
Using the Mathews Test—to balance the interests of parents,
the likelihood that parents might be erroneously deprived of those
interests, and any conflicting state interests—the court found that
indigent parents have a limited right to an attorney when trying to
regain custody or increase visitation of a child under guardianship.51
In brief summary, the court reasoned that regardless of what
stage the guardianship proceeding was in, the parents’ liberty
interests at stake were the same:
It would be incongruous to recognize the significance of the

47. L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Prob. & Family Ct. Dep’t, 49 N.E.3d 230, 232
(Mass. 2016) (emphasis added).
48. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2012).
49. See Guardianship of J.T., 49 N.E.3d 242 (Mass. 2016).
50. L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 231.
51. See id.
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parent’s rights for due process purposes at the time those rights
are first displaced, as we did in Guardianship of V.V., but not to
do so at the time the parent seeks to regain them. The
deprivation at the former stage and the continued deprivation
at the latter stage are equally real and significant.52

The court also stressed that “[v]isitation, like custody, is at the
core of a parent’s relationship with a child[.]”53 Visitation was
considered especially critical for parents who “aspire[] to regain
custody at some point” because visitation “provides an opportunity
to maintain a physical, emotional, and psychological bond” with the
child and to “demonstrate the ability to properly care for the
child.”54 Next, the court found the risk of erroneous deprivation of
these rights was equally significant and substantial: “The risk of
erroneously adjudicating these fundamental rights and interests of
parents is no less real at the guardian removal stage than at the
appointment stage.”55 As the court pointed out, a judge has to
make “complex determinations” during these stages, “consider[ing]
numerous factors regarding the child’s best interest and the
parent’s fitness.”56 The judge not only has to weigh the competency
of the parent, but also must consider the potential effect the change
in guardianship will have on the child, including consideration of
whether or not a substantial guardian-child bond has developed
and, if so, whether or not the strength and nature of that bond
renders an otherwise fit parent unfit to care for the bonded child.57
These complex decisions are not easily made. Accordingly, the
court found “[t]he presence of counsel for a parent will both help
to protect the parent’s rights and interests in this regard and assist a
judge to ensure accuracy and fairness in his or her adjudications.”58
Finally, the court considered the state’s interest in “efficient

52. Id. at 236.
53. Id. at 239.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 236.
56. Id.
57. A decision to terminate a guardianship is not based on parental fitness alone;
chapter 190B, section 5-212 of Massachusetts General Laws requires a showing that
removal is “in the best interest[s]” of the child. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-212
(2009).
58. L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 237. The SJC’s language in L.B. seems to confine the right
to counsel to petitions to remove guardians that would restore a parent’s custody. See
id. at 236 n.12. The extent of a parent’s right to counsel where the child’s other parent
is the moving party is yet undefined. See id.
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and economic administration of its affairs.”59 Similar to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter, the court in L.B. noted
that not all cases would require appointment of counsel in order to
protect due process, for example, in cases where the parents have
“no hope of prevailing.”60 The court suggested that, although the
fundamental rights at stake are no different for a parent seeking to
regain custody than for a parent seeking to retain custody, the risk
of erroneous deprivation may be lower.61 This may be because in
post-decree proceedings a parent is typically the moving party and
could, in some cases, abuse the system with frivolous pleadings,
whereas, in pre-decree proceedings the parent is defending against
an action brought by another. As a result, the court held that,
whereas due process requires an indigent parent be provided the
appointment of counsel upon request in pre-decree guardianship
proceedings, due process requires access to counsel in post-decree
petitions to remove a guardian or to expand parental visitation only
where the parent has presented a “meritorious” claim for relief.62
III.

FUTURE LITIGATION

The decision in L.B. leaves the door open to future appellate
advocacy on the contours of the right to counsel in this area of
practice. Most likely, advocates will push for a clear understanding
of what is needed to meet the “meritorious claim” standard in L.B.
Advocates may also continue to seek expansion of a civil right to
counsel by applying parent versus third-party arguments to parent
versus parent cases, pushing for automatic appointment of counsel
for children who are the subjects of guardianship petitions and
decrees, or promoting the rights and interests of long-term
guardians faced with petitions for removal.
A. Meritorious Claim
Both in the parties’ arguments and in the court’s decision,
significant attention was paid to what an unrepresented litigant
could reasonably be expected to present in order to trigger a right
to counsel. The issue was addressed in the parties’ briefs, at oral

59. Id. at 235.
60. Id. at 237 (citing Roe v. Att’y Gen., 750 N.E.2d 897, 904 (Mass. 2001),
quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The court noted that having
counsel in such instances would “add little value.” Id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 242–43.
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argument, and in the court’s decision. Petitioners argued that, to
the extent a limit on the right to counsel were warranted,
restrictions on the frequency of court reviews, analogous to those
found in the care and protection statute, would be sufficient.63
Unlike the decision in V.V., the court in L.B. did not draw parallels
between guardianship and care and protection proceedings.64 As
respondent in L.B., Chief Justice Ordoñez asserted the bar should
be high: an indigent parent petitioning to remove a guardian and
regain custody of his or her child “should be required to make an
initial showing that there have been ‘substantial and relevant
changed circumstances’ since the guardian was appointed.”65 The
court rejected this approach, stating this proposed burden would
require a parent to show changed circumstances “in a legally
significant manner and to a legally cognizable degree” before the
right to counsel arises.66 Instead, the court settled on a “lighter, less
technical burden” that would instead require the parent to
demonstrate “that he or she has a colorable or ‘meritorious’
claim.”67
In settling on the standard of “meritorious,” the SJC was
careful to define the term as not requiring a showing that is “legally
significant” or “legally cognizable.”68 The court found, “[i]t would
be unusual and potentially unfair to require a litigant unaided by
counsel to make that kind of a legal demonstration before the right
to counsel arises.”69 The court also provided a number of
references to the “meritorious” standard in a variety of legal
contexts to emphasize its ubiquity in Massachusetts case law.70

63. Impounded Case: SJC-11882, SUFFOLK U. L. SCH., http://www.suffolk.edu/
sjc/archive/2015/SJC_11892.html [https://perma.cc/5QKB-7MJT] (webcast of case
hearing from Oct. 5, 2015).
64. L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Dep’t, 49 N.E.3d 230
(Mass. 2016).
65. Id. at 238.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing In re Gen. Motors Corp., 182 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1962) (“A
meritorious case means one that is worthy of presentation to a court, not one which is
sure of success”)); see also id. at 239 n.17 (citing Commonwealth v. Gunter, 945 N.E.2d
386 (Mass. 2011)); Lovell v. Lovell, 176 N.E. 210, 211 (Mass. 1931) (stating that a
petition to remove default decree requires a meritorious claim or defense to assert
“one which is worthy of judicial inquiry”); Jones v. Manns, 602 N.E.2d 217, 222 n.9
(Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (involving “meritorious issues, in the usual sense of that phrase
in appellate practice” i.e., “worthy of presentation to a court”); Commonwealth v.
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Despite the terms’ broad and varied application, its meaning in
the context of a custody case is unclear.
Indeed, while
“meritorious” may be a familiar standard to the court, it may not
be self-evident to unrepresented litigants. What does meritorious
mean in the context of a parent seeking to regain custody or
increase visitation? If a parent consented to the guardianship at its
inception, is withdrawal of consent sufficient to establish a
meritorious claim for removal of the guardianship? Is completion
of a drug rehabilitation program sufficient? Is it sufficient if a
previous attempt at sobriety was not successful? Is a claim that a
guardian refuses to allow visitation, or enough visitation, sufficient
to merit a right to counsel? Where the court will draw the line
between claims that are meritorious and claims that are not
remains to be seen, and the ability of parents to challenge adverse
rulings pro se is questionable. Interpretation of the meaning of
meritorious in a custody case may still approach the boundary of
requiring self-represented parents to interpret questions of law
without counsel.
B.

Further Expansion of a Parent’s Right to Counsel

It is noteworthy that many of the factors justifying a right to
counsel in parent versus third-party custody cases are also present
in parent versus parent custody cases. In J.K.B., the court observed
parental termination cases often involve “complex questions of fact
and law” and the “marshalling and rebutting of sophisticated
expert testimony” and found “appointed counsel not only
safeguards the rights of the parents, but it assists the court . . . .”71
The same can be said of many custody battles, which pit one
parent’s fundamental rights against those of the other, while the
child(ren)’s rights and best interests hang in the balance. In
Meaghan, the court held that the same issues and same
complexities identified in J.K.B. warranted access to counsel even
in cases between private parties, so the absence of the state in
parent versus parent cases does not lessen the risk to parents’
fundamental rights.72 The court in V.V. found access to counsel
Levin, 388 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (meritorious standard “connotes
opposite of frivolous” in context of stay of execution); Tisei v. Bldg. Inspector of
Marlborough, 330 N.E.2d 488, 489 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (on motion for leave to
docket appeal, moving party must show “a case meritorious or substantial in the sense
of presenting a question of law deserving judicial investigation and discussion”).
71. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Mass. 1979).
72. See In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Mass. 2012).
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necessary even in cases in which parental rights were merely at risk
of suspension, not termination.73 And, finally, in L.B., the court
recognized the importance of visitation alone in protecting and
maintaining a parent’s right to a relationship with one’s child.74
Are these arguments applicable to parent versus parent custody
cases?
The legislature has recognized that access to counsel may be
critical in some cases between parents, and has provided courts
discretionary power to allocate marital funds to pay for a party’s
representation or, in the case of never-married parents, to appoint
counsel for either party.75 A 1989 SJC study found that lack of
access to attorneys had created a justice gap for women, in
particular, and encouraged invocation of chapter 208, section 17 of
Massachusetts General Laws as a means of relief.76 “[T]here is too
little legal help available to moderate-income women, in part
because judges fail to award adequate counsel fees, especially
during the pendency of litigation. . . . Judges must award adequate
attorney fees during the pendency of litigation.”77 To what extent
this gap remains today is unknown, however, the number of
unrepresented litigants in the Probate and Family Courts has
increased and now sits at above fifty percent, suggesting the
discretionary authority to appoint counsel is insufficient to meet
the needs of today’s litigants.78 While a right to counsel in a parent
versus parent custody case has yet to be recognized by either the
legislature or the courts, perhaps the case for appointed counsel
could be made in the future.
C.

Right to Counsel for Children
If, as the court held in V.V. and L.B., there is a constitutionally

73. See id.
74. See L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 239–242.
75. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 17 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 7
(2015).
76. See RUTH I. ABRAMS & JOHN M. GREANEY, REPORT OF THE GENDER
BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 20 (1989).
77. Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745,
764–67 (1990).
78. See MASS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE SECOND
MASSACHUSETTS ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION 7 (April 2015),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/massachusetts-access-to-justice-commissionfinal-report-april-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3X2-YFX9] (stating that, “[i]n the
Probate and Family Court, . . . an estimated 50 to 75% of all litigants statewide are
unrepresented”).
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based right to counsel for parents in guardianship proceedings,
would the court also find that children have a similar right? In
L.B., the court declined to address whether children have their own
right to counsel in guardianship removal proceedings.79 This may
be because, by statute, a child is entitled to appointed counsel in
some circumstances. Specifically, chapter 190B of the
Massachusetts General Laws requires for the appointment of
counsel to children in any of three instances: (1) the child asks the
court for counsel, although it is unclear how a child would know to
ask for counsel; (2) a parent or guardian asks the court to appoint
counsel on behalf of the child, which assumes an adult knows to
ask and chooses to do so; or (3) the trial judge sua sponte orders
the appointment of counsel for the child, which relies on the trial
judge’s discretion.80 Until the court reviews this issue, it will remain
unsettled whether the statute sufficiently protects a child’s
fundamental liberty interests, and yet it is hard to imagine
circumstances in which the matter would properly be brought to
the court’s attention. A child would need legal counsel to make
such an argument, and the argument would be moot if the child had
counsel. Given that advocates for a child’s right to counsel have
this especially challenging hurdle to clear, the legislature may be a
more effective venue to amend the current statute to allow for an
absolute right to counsel. Protection of children is a politically safe
and noble ground to walk; perhaps advocates should shift attention
away from the courts and seek a statutory fix instead.
D. Right to Counsel for Guardians
What about the rights of non-parents who have, nonetheless,
created family bonds with a child? The questions of who is a
parent and what constitutes family have been garnering attention
and challenges to traditional definitions have been getting positive
results. This past fall, the SJC found that a person who has acted as
a parent to the child of another may have standing to establish his
or her parenthood under chapter 209C of the Massachusetts
General Laws, regardless of biology and in spite of the parties not
being married.81 Does this open the door to recognizing a right to

79. See L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 237.
80. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-202 (2009).
81. See Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 (Mass. 2016). “[I]t is apparent
that a biological connection is not a sine qua non to the establishment of parentage
under G.L. c. 209C.” Id. at 4.
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counsel for non-parents in custody cases?
In the context of guardianship, a limited statutory right to
counsel already exists, and advocates are pushing for broader
access to court-appointed attorneys for long-time parental figures.82
A case recently decided in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court asks for recognition of a guardian’s right to counsel in
private guardianship cases.83 It is noteworthy that, as recently as
2014, the SJC contrasted the fundamental rights of parents with the
limited rights of guardians, noting that guardians are “solely
creatures of statute.”84 This characterization undermines the
guardians’ argument. Without a fundamental right to anchor
guardians’ due process rights, it is difficult to see a path to a
constitutionally based right to counsel for guardians.
CONCLUSION
Efforts to expand a civil right to counsel continue, and there is
plenty of interesting work to be done, both in the context of child
custody and beyond. Whether watching the implementation of the
L.B. decision with an eye toward protecting and expanding this
newly identified right to counsel, looking for opportunities to apply
the right-to-counsel analysis to other custody proceedings, or
lobbying the legislature for a child’s right to counsel in custody
proceedings or a tenant’s right to counsel in eviction proceedings,
opportunities await and advocates are needed.

82. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (2011) (providing that guardians of
children who subsequently become subjects of care and protection proceedings, if
indigent, are entitled to court-appointed counsel).
83. See Guardianship of K.N., 476 Mass. 762 (2017).
84. See Care & Prot. of Jamison, 4 N.E.3d 889 (Mass. 2014).

